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Abstract
The present text is the second part of the analysis of the socio-political reali-
ties which contributed to the evolution of Dutch immigration and integration 
policies following World War Two. The first part, which appeared in the pre-
ceding issue of this publication (Bunka Ronshu n.41-42) discussed the arrival of 
the early migrants in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the absence of a cohesive govern-
ment response vis-à-vis these minority groups, and finally the emergence of 
the ‘Ethnic Minorities’ policy, a model characterized by government support 
of the plurality of religious and cultural institutions in Holland. This period, 
lasting through the end of the 1980’s, was also marked by a high degree of 
public tolerance of ethnic diversity in the nation and, more importantly, by de-
polemicized political rhetoric. While this adopted approach was not called 
multicultural per se at that time, the basic principles underlying governmental 
policies were congruent with the multicultural ideology. In the following pages 
I will examine a dramatic shift in the immigration policy throughout the 
1990’s as the Dutch policymakers and the general public became increasingly 
conscious of the shortcomings of the ‘Ethnic Minorities’ policies. The policy 
shifted further to the right following high profile assassinations in the Nether-
lands and the attacks of September 11 in the United States. These and other 
events were catalysts responsible for the paradigmatic changes in the public 
discourse addressing the issues of cultural diversity in the Netherlands. Yet, 
has this oft-criticized rhetoric promoting assimilation really translated into a 
radically different set of government policies?
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1. 0 The first shift: from the Ethnic Minorities (EM) Policy 
 to the Integration Policy
The EM Policy of the 1980’s can be seen as a logical extension of the tra-
dition of pillarization in Dutch society. The government chose to treat 
immigrants as another minority. Many ethnic religious and educational insti-
tutions received general public funding, the teaching of migrants’ home 
languages was promoted in schools, and perseverance of cultural identities 
was acknowledged as a prerequisite for successful integration of newcomers 
into Dutch society. While one of the stated objectives of this policy was to 
achieve equality for migrants in the socio-economic sphere, there was rela-
tively little public scrutiny of the reality of migrants’ lives. Questions related 
to the integration of immigrants, more broadly, and to the successes and fail-
ures of the EM Policy, more specifically, received little media attention. 
However, the evidence of ‘non-integration’ was increasingly present and pub-
lic concerns grew. Towards the end of the 1980’s it became clear that a large 
majority of immigrants were economically disadvantaged and marginalized. 
In urban areas they typically settled in segregated neighborhoods, maintained 
little social contact with the native Dutch population and worked in low-pay-
ing positions. Furthermore, there was no evidence of upward mobility for 
second-generation migrants. Unemployment, in particular, was of paramount 
concern. The late 1980’s and early 1990’s witnessed a major restructuring of 
the Dutch economy, accompanied by a contraction of the industrial sector. 
Low-skilled jobs, dominated by workers of immigrant origin, were lost and 
without more advanced skills to function in an increasingly sophisticated 
Dutch marketplace, these workers found themselves unemployable. By the 
end of the 1980’s over 30% of Turk and Moroccan migrants were out of a job, 
becoming a public burden. The overall unemployment levels among migrant 
groups were significantly higher than among the native Dutch, underscoring 
the failure of the EM Policy to provide the necessary guidance and structure 
to ensure migrants’ economic autonomy (Carle, 2006).
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The first major salvo at the EM Policy was launched by the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (WRR) in its report published in 1989. The 
report stated that little progress had been made in the areas of employment 
and education. The document further intimated that an overemphasis on the 
maintenance of the original cultural identity was one of the factors responsi-
ble for this deficiency. The paper concluded that paying too much attention 
to the preservation of the migrants’ home cultures does not accelerate their 
integration into Dutch society; on the contrary it constitutes a hindrance on 
their path to acquire competences which would enable them to take full 
advantage of economic opportunities and to recognize the value of educa-
tional options.
The Council’s report by itself did not achieve a major policy transition; 
however, it was significant in two ways. First of all, this very critical report 
by an influential government think tank, close to the Prime Minister, pushed 
the key question of how to manage diversity in the Netherlands into the pub-
lic spotlight. From now on, this and related issues were no longer on the 
periphery of the national political arena but very much at the center of the 
social polemic and of the political debates that ensued. Secondly, the report 
triggered a shift in public consciousness of what was perceived as politically 
correct. The EM policy was underpinned by an understanding that migrants 
have rights ‒ in part stemming from their religious and socio-cultural distinc-
tiveness -- which should be respected by the native Dutch populace. The 
Scientific Council put a crack in this dictum by recommending that the gov-
ernment place more emphasis on concrete policies aimed at integrating 
immigrants into Dutch society and invest less effort into the maintenance of 
their heritage and the promotion of their cultural rights. In brief, the report 
proposed that the burden of cultural accommodation be shifted more to the 
immigrants. The language of the text made it clear that more needed to be 
done to recalibrate the balance between the obligations of the migrants and 
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their extended rights.
The publication of this report opened the floodgates to the growing public 
criticism of the multicultural policies, reflecting a marked change in the way 
immigrants were perceived by society. This mass anxiety was intensified as 
the number of Muslim migrants in Holland continued to rise and Islam 
became a permanent fixture in the Dutch religious landscape. This phenome-
non can be illustrated by politicians’ statements, many made for electoral 
gain. Frits Bolkestein was the first senior politician, leader of the Liberal 
Party, to denounce Islam. In his speech in 1991 he stated that Islam repre-
sented a threat to migrants’ successful integration, and more importantly, 
that Islam was incompatible with the principles of a liberal democracy.
Bolkestein’s inflammatory speech caused a short-lived furor, largely 
because it was the first public attack on Islam, and was seen as a rejection of 
the political correctness and of the self-imposed censorship that prevailed in 
the Dutch political discourse of the 1980s. The issue of how to integrate a 
growing number of Muslims living in Holland, many poorly educated and 
with very limited employment prospects, will remain close to the center of 
national debates for many years to come, reaching their intensity in the early 
2000s, when two prominent Dutch personalities ‒ a populist politician and a 
filmmaker ‒ were assassinated for criticizing Islam.
The growing recognition that the conciliatory policies of the 1980s did 
not produce the desired results, and moreover, may have actually promoted 
social alienation and economic disfranchisement among migrants, has forced 
the government to take concrete action. Starting in 1994, a new integration 
policy, focusing on migrant involvement in mainstream institutions, prioritiza-
tion of Dutch values and norms, and a shift towards a set of compulsory 
integration mechanisms, was implemented. The stated objectives of this pol-
icy were to enable migrants to participate more fully in the labor market of 
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the host country, to improve their status in society, and to bridge the cultural 
gap between the native Dutch and the newcomers (Vasta, 2007). This policy 
can be broadly characterized by the following tenets:
(1) While the EM Policy was directed at all migrants equally, regardless 
of their socio-economic standing, the new policy identified disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals of foreign origin as its main target. Improving 
employment, housing and education for these groups rather than encouraging 
them to construct and preserve a cultural niche within a dominant Dutch 
society represented a turning point.
(2) Inability to attain a higher economic position in society was attrib-
uted to the lack of familiarity with the Dutch language and societal norms. A 
language program to provide basic training in Dutch and a civic integration 
course were implemented. These state-funded services were offered on a vol-
untary basis to migrants initially but over the course of the decade they 
became more compulsory in nature, with various incentives and penalties 
attached for successful completion and failure, respectively.
(3) Integration of migrants was now much more the privy of the State 
which was acting as the main agent of this process, whereas the EM Policy 
was characterized by the reliance on the immigrant structures and commu-
nity leaders. Consultations with immigrant organizations continued; however 
the state assumed a more controlling stance with regard to the trajectory 
migrants were expected to follow after their arrival in the Netherlands. (Bru-
quetas-Callejo, 2007)
Among a host of government-funded programs intended to fight unem-
ployment and provide migrants with a wider range of marketable skills, two 
landmark initiatives stand out: Dutch language training and a civic integra-
tion course. The central pillar of the Newcomer Integration Law (NIL) 
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enacted in 1998 was the launch of a 12-month course which combined 600 
hours of language training with information about the Dutch lifestyle, 
accepted behavioral norms and important public institutions. (Entzinger, 
2003). In fact, prior to being implemented at the national level, many urban 
communities with large concentrations of migrants had already made efforts 
to provide newcomers with toolkits containing Dutch-language training mate-
rials and information about the country. The NIL systematized these 
municipality-led measures into a national policy.
The introduction of language and civic integration courses left a contro-
versial legacy. Some critics argued that this policy instrument represented a 
shift away from a “live and let live” approach traditionally embraced by 
Dutch society towards an assimilationist model. They also claim that the pol-
icy singled out Muslims, and thereby was discriminatory. (see Kymlicka, 
Kymlicka and Banting (eds.), 2006 for a full discussion). The evidence these 
observers present is that the courses were mandatory for all non-EU new-
comers into the country and failure to register and to attend these courses 
was punishable by a fine. What is overlooked in this analysis is that the seem-
ingly coercive nature of the policy was still well within the liberal tradition of 
the state offering services to diverse ethnic groups under its jurisdiction. The 
courses were free and fines for non-compliance were very rarely imposed in 
practice. While the linguistic instruction was not always successful, the prob-
lems were more organizational in nature rather than with the policy design. 
(Entzinger, 2006). (I will return to a more detailed assessment of this instru-
ment in the following paragraph.) It should be noted that the successful 
completion of the integration courses became increasingly mandatory over 
the next 10 years reflecting a public mood demanding that migrants make 
more concerted efforts to adjust to Dutch socio-cultural norms and fulfil their 
responsibilities as members of the host society.
Were the integration policies of the 1990’s successful? The results based 
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on statistical data are mixed though there was evidence of significant amelio-
ration in the socio-economic status of immigrants. Considering a plethora of 
measures undertaken at the local and national levels, including the integra-
tion courses, it is difficult to identify which specific instrument was the 
preeminent agent of change. Greatest progress was evident in the very 
domain which the policy sought to address: the economic position of the non-
Dutch population. Between 1990 and 1995 migrant unemployment declined 
sharply (Dagevos et al, 2003 cited in Ebtzinger, 2006). As their unemployment 
rate still remained well above the national average, it continues to be a mat-
ter of debate whether this decline is attributable to the effectiveness of 
government policies or the result of a very robust European economy at the 
end of the 20th century. Another area of success was education. Dropout rates 
declined significantly and immigrants were much more represented at the 
tertiary level than before, though their participation rate still lagged behind 
that of their native Dutch counterparts. Progress was also noted in housing. 
Migrants continued to reside primarily in lower-class communities; however 
these enclaves were less segregated, and immigrants and native Dutch with 
comparable levels of income lived in housing of similar quality.
There was fear, especially among left-wing critics, that the emphasis on 
economic integration would come at the expense of cultural uprooting. In 
other words, the transfer of resources from cultural and religious institutions 
of migrants’ communities to measures promoting economic participation and 
social integration would result in an identity crisis for many. The evidence 
points to the contrary. There was a dramatic increase in naturalizations in 
the 1990s, particularly among immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan ancestry. 
While some analysts (De Hart, 2004). dismiss this phenomenon as a desire to 
take advantage of opportunities available to citizens of an EU member state, 
this trend does point to a higher degree of psychological identification of 
immigrants with their host nation.
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2.0 Second turning point: integration in the 21st century
Seen in retrospect, the turn of the century ushered in a new ideological 
climate surrounding the effects of immigrants on Dutch society. Public 
debates about the integration of migrants became increasingly open, inclusive 
and vociferous. The issue of diversity, and how to best manage it, became 
central to most electoral campaigns, at both local and national levels, with a 
number of political leaders sensing suppressed dissatisfaction among Dutch 
voters with the status quo. They exploited this sentiment of discontent often 
with provocative rhetoric aimed at intensifying even more the tone of dis-
course. While in the 1980’s and (admittedly less so) in the 1990’s, the 
discussions relative to the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of successive integra-
tion policies were limited to a small circle of technocrats and policymakers, in 
the first decade of the new millennium a much wider spectrum of state 
actors, from NGOs to intellectuals to migrants themselves, became engaged. 
Finally, it became politically acceptable to argue against the principles of mul-
ticulturalism, to address the deficiencies of policies based on the philosophy of 
cultural relativism, and to discuss the question of ethnic diversity without the 
fear of overstepping the boundaries of political correctness. Gloves have come 
off. If anything, it is coming to the defense of multiculturalism that is now 
likely to provoke public ire and be perceived as politically gauche. Several 
developments served as catalysts of this seismic shift. These events were 
seemingly isolated but interconnected at the deeper level to exert a formida-
ble influence on the public psyche
2. 1 The Netherlands: A Multicultural tragedy
The first, and arguably the most influential episode, was the publication in 
January of 2000 of an article The Multicultural Tragedy by Paul Scheffer. 
The article attracted much attention not only for its content and tone but 
also because this text was penned by a prominent scholar and politician and 
appeared not in an obscure government publication but in a leading Dutch 
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newspaper. Essentially, Scheffer declared that multiculturalism had failed as 
a viable integration policy in the Netherlands. He justified his conclusions by 
arguing that immigrants had formed a new ‘underclass’, segregated from the 
mainstream Dutch society. Immigrants, particularly Muslims from non-west-
ern backgrounds, shared no common values with the Dutch who were raised 
on the tradition of tolerance, equal rights, and democracy. As a result of this 
insurmountable gap, the new migrants were not able, and more importantly, 
not willing to adjust to the norms prevalent in Holland. Scheffer further 
accused the government of glossing over the failures of multicultural policies 
claiming that the authorities had invested too much political capital in the 
ideology of cultural relativism to have a realistic and unbiased assessment of 
the problems the country was facing as a result of the growing numbers of 
immigrants. He especially singled out the Muslim population as the group 
incompatible with the mainstream fabric of society. Sceffer warned that if the 
state policies were not radically altered and demanded more of immigrants, 
Holland risked losing its values and liberal traditions. He also raised the spec-
ter of a complete breakdown in social cohesion, with unemployed migrants 
resorting to crime and overwhelming the national welfare system.
While Scheffer’s comments were met with some criticism, they were not 
dismissed as fringe racist remarks. The debate this article generated demon-
strated that his concerns resonated with a large segment of the Dutch 
population. The important question is: Was Scheffer correct in his assessment 
at a time when the government cited empirical evidence to show the new 
policies were working?
Scheffer was accused of stereotyping, ‘painting all migrants with one 
brush’ and not taking into account the immense complexity of immigrant 
groups and their individual characteristics. The charge of overgeneralization 
is valid; however, it should be remembered that Scheffer was writing a news-
paper article and not an academic essay, and generalizations are common in 
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journalistic trade. The claim of religious radicalism among the Muslim youth 
is not supported by evidence. According to the results of the survey con-
ducted in 1999, a majority of 15-24 year olds of Islamic background showed 
acceptance of the major tenets of democracy: individual freedom and equality. 
This trend was particularly pronounced among second-generation immigrants 
(Phalet et al. 2000, cited in Entzinger, 2006).
On the questions of migrants’ economic marginalization, however, Schef-
fer’s views were based on a comparison with the native Dutch while the 
government claimed success by contrasting immigrants with themselves; i.e. 
looking at the improvement in economic indicators over an interval of time. 
Through the 1990’s, as stated above, unemployment rates among most minor-
ity groups declined. However their participation in the labor market remained 
weak. While just over 3% of native Dutch were unemployed in 2000, the fig-
ure for immigrants with Western backgrounds was 5% and for those with 
non-Western backgrounds, i.e. predominantly Turks, Moroccans and Surinam-
ese, was over 10%. This disparity in fact, widened throughout the decade, 
with unemployment among non-Western migrants hovering between 10% 
and 15% (Statistics Netherlands, 2013). Economic inequality was largely a 
byproduct of poor educational attainment. School dropout rates remained 
higher for immigrant children than for their native Dutch peers and a much 
higher proportion of migrant youth, especially from outside Europe, had no 
basic qualifications (Statistics Netherlands, 2012).
2. 2 The rise (and fall) of Pim Fortuyn
The next critical juncture in the evolution of a popular sentiment 
towards immigrants came with the emergence of Pim Fortuyn on the 
national scene. Fortuyn was an obscure politician with strong anti-immigrant, 
and particularly anti-Muslim views, which he expressed through fringe right-
wing publications. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United 
States elevated the scrutiny of Muslim communities in the Netherlands and 
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propelled Fortuyn to prominence. His verbal attacks targeted not immigrants 
per se, as was the case with right-wing politicians in France, Germany and 
Finland, who made migrants scapegoats for the economic and other ills of 
their respective nations. Fortuyn criticized the government for ignoring the 
problems for the sake of ideology. He stressed that Holland simply no longer 
had the physical or financial resources to accommodate an ever-increasing 
number of migrants. He also warned against the prospect of Holland becom-
ing an Islamic state. (Penninx, 2006).
In a true populist tradition Fortuyn could sense the mood of the elector-
ate more accurately than the mainstream parties. He initially joined 
“LiveableNetherlands”, a newly formed party with a strong anti-establishment 
platform and was elected its leader. The party apparatchiks did not find his 
views particularly palatable and he went on to establish his own party, mod-
estly christened List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). Without a substantive or innovative 
political agenda, he campaigned on an anti-immigrant ticket trying to take 
advantage of the voters’ dissatisfaction with what they perceived as the gov-
ernment’s inability to take a tougher stand on the immigration issue.
Fortuyn’s legacy lies not so much in his political ascent, which largely 
benefited from the atmosphere prevailing in the aftermath of the September 
11 attacks, but in how his untimely death and unexpected popularity have 
influenced the platforms of other political parties in the nation. Fortuyn was 
killed by an environmental extremist less than two weeks before the elec-
tions, yet despite (or perhaps because of) this murder, his party obtained 
enough votes to become the second largest block in the Dutch Parliament 
(Vink, 2007). Within a year, following the elections in 2003, LPF lost most of 
its seats yet its anti-immigrant rhetoric was emulated by many other political 
parties. Criticism of immigrants, of their inability to integrate and of the gov-
ernment for not applying more coercive measures to newcomers moved from 
the fringes of political debates to the main arena and mainstream statesmen 
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joined in the fray.
2. 3 The murder of Theo van Gogh
The third personality to shape the immigration discourse was a Dutch 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh. He was known for his strident anti-Islamic per-
sonal views which he expressed through this work. He accused Muslims of 
being intolerant of views and values different from their own, of mistreat-
ment of women and of curtailing personal rights and freedom of choice. In 
2004 van Gogh was brutally murdered by a second-generation Moroccan-
Dutch. The crime was clearly retribution for the filmmaker’s criticism of 
Islam -- the assassin pinned to his victim’s chest a death threat to Hirsi Ali, a 
Dutch politician of Somalian origin. She collaborated with van Gogh on the 
creation of a movie which was critical of the way women were treated under 
Islam. The murder committed in broad daylight by a person born and edu-
cated in the Netherlands elevated the already polemicized issue of migrant 
integration to a new level of emotional intensity. The crime was interpreted 
by many as irrefutable evidence that the multicultural approach had failed 
and that encouraging migrants with diverse backgrounds to preserve their 
value systems was not compatible with the expectations of a Western democ-
racy. The killing of van Gogh was followed by persistent calls to curtail public 
support of Islamic schools on the grounds that Islam was not a religion but a 
political ideology. (2008 government report cited in Velhuis and van der Maas, 
2011)
3. 0 Instruments of change
The 2000 ‒ 2012 period, punctuated by two high-profile murders, attacks 
in the United States, a steady increase in the numbers of migrants (particu-
larly from non-Western origins) and the economic recession in Europe, saw 
growing impatience among the Dutch with the demands a policy of multicul-
turalism imposed on them. The calls for shifting the burden of adjustment to 
the immigrants and preserving the traditional values of the dominant ethnic 
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groups were frequent, loud and urgent. So, what was the government’s reac-
tion, or did these calls remain just that: belligerent rhetoric without any 
reflection in the policy instruments?
3. 1 New Style Integration Policy
To ensure political survival in the social climate of the day, the succes-
sive Dutch governments had to act. In 2004, Rita Verdonk, the Minister of 
Integration, launched a new set of policies aimed at making the integration 
process more controlled and prescriptive. The central mechanism of this pol-
icy was a mandatory civic integration test. It was composed of two parts: a 
Dutch language exam and a test of the knowledge of Dutch culture and soci-
ety. While language training had long been provided by Dutch municipalities, 
this represented a significant departure from an earlier model. First of all, 
training was no longer offered for free. Immigrants were provided with rele-
vant guidance but it was their responsibility to undergo training and pass the 
exams within a fixed time period, typically five years after arrival in the 
Netherlands. Repeated failure resulted (at least technically) in the individual 
being denied permanent residence status. Access to naturalization was also 
contingent on passing the test. Overcoming this threshold promised a num-
ber of financial incentives (Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment, 2010).
The two principal controversies about this measure related to its imposi-
tion on persons still residing outside Holland and to the fact that this 
requirement did not apply uniformly to migrants of all origins.
The Netherlands was the first European state to require language profi-
ciency and knowledge of Dutch culture of those applying for residency. 
Anyone wishing to obtain a long-term visa, including those seeking entry for 
family reunification purposes, had to pass the test to qualify. This relatively 
expensive test (350 Euros) could be taken at any Dutch mission. Holland 
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became the target of criticism by many international groups who perceived 
this reach of the law, extending beyond Dutch borders, as a sign of rising 
intolerance of outside values, if not of outright xenophobia. Civic integration 
policy clearly targeted non-Western immigrants. This requirement did not 
apply to the holders of passports of EU member states (or Switzerland), 
prompting accusations of selective, racist application (Kern, 2011). In 2011, the 
exam was made more difficult, with the Dutch language section being 
expanded to incorporate reading and comprehension skills components. The 
passing bar was raised as well, from A1- (according to the CEFR taxonomy) 
to A1 and to A2 for naturalization.
A number of other changes were adopted in line with the overriding pol-
icy to compel migrants to make more diligent efforts to conform to Dutch 
norms and in doing so, to weaken their identification with their home cul-
tures. This was particularly apparent by the push to make dual nationality 
illegal. In 2011, Piet Donner, Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations, 
stated,
“The government would, wherever possible, like people to have one 
nationality only. . . . . .anyone wishing to acquire Dutch nationality will need 
to relinquish the nationality of their country of origin.” (Donner, 2011)
Other measures included the termination of special subsidies to Muslim 
groups and institutions, as the government decided to de-focus its attention 
from specific ethnic minorities and apply a more general integration policy. 
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2011).
4. 0 Has multiculturalism in the Netherlands 
 been destroyed?
As we have seen, integration policies in the Netherlands underwent a 
number of very fundamental changes since the 1980’s. Many observers (see 
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Entzinger, 2003; 2006; Vink, 2007; Joppke, 2004; 2007) seem unequivocal in 
their conclusion that multiculturalism in Holland is in retreat. By and large, 
they base their analyses not on the examination of specific policy instru-
ments, including the impact of relevant laws and regulations that have been 
passed, but on the statements made by high-profile politicians which may or 
may not have translated into concrete action. So, what is happening in the 
Netherlands today? Are we witnessing the rise of a ‘repressive liberalism’ 
with the county succumbing to the most dictatorial variant of civic integra-
tion, as Joppke (2007) argues. In this section I propose to look at various sub-
categories of multiculturalism and see where the country stands now.
4. 1 Civic integration test: a repressive measure?
By making the test mandatory, the government seeks to ensure that 
immigrants wishing to settle in the Netherlands are equipped with the neces-
sary linguistic and practical knowledge to be able to function in society. Lack 
of basic knowledge of the Dutch language does impede participation in the 
labor market and educational attainment. While the proficiency requirements 
have been raised, the expected output is still at the beginner level (A1 or A2), 
thus not especially onerous. Fulfilling this requirement does oblige the appli-
cant to be able to carry on a very basic conversation in Dutch and be familiar 
with the workings of Dutch institutions. This requirement is practical in a 
sense that it forces the migrant (whether prospective or resident) to be pre-
pared to conduct everyday activities in the local language. It should be also 
noted that the cost of taking the examination (350 Euros) can be fully reim-
bursed in many cases, provided the person passes it within three years of 
settlement. Finally, the exam does not apply to the families of those granted 
asylum in the Netherlands, and to a number of other groups. The law does 
target migrants from non-Western backgrounds who have been dispropor-
tionately relying on public assistance, largely due to language and skill 
limitations. In summary, the civic integration test represents an attempt to 
provide immigrants with the necessary skills to facilitate their entry into 
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Dutch society, and to do so within an institutionalized context. More studies 
are certainly warranted to investigate the effectiveness of this instrument of 
integration, namely: does passing the test have an effect on one’s earning 
potential? does the test really equip the takers with the skills needed to func-
tion at the early stages of their settlement in the Netherlands? and how does 
the test influence the identity of migrants, mainly their psychological sense of 
belonging to the host country?
4. 2 Dual citizenship: a red herring
As was mentioned earlier in this paper, key policy makers (Wilders, 2007; 
Donner, 2011) have proposed a formal ban on dual citizenship. Today, in prin-
ciple, all those obtaining Dutch nationality through naturalization have to 
renounce their other citizenship. However, we encounter the case of practice 
not conforming to the letter of the law. While dual citizenship is de jure ille-
gal, it is very rarely enforced in practice. The revised Kingdom Act on Dutch 
Nationality of 2003 stipulates a number of exemptions from the formal 
requirement to renounce prior citizenship, making this legal provision virtu-
ally unenforceable.
4. 3 Public Islamic schools
The Dutch constitution guarantees the right to set up denominational 
schools and, more importantly, to receive public funding. This Freedom of 
Education Act became highly contested following the inspection of Islamic 
schools in 2008. The audit found widespread financial irregularities, non-com-
pliance with the relevant Dutch laws, and a very poor level of teaching 
quality compared to the competences displayed at Dutch schools. Yet, despite 
the public outcry and the repeated demands by politicians to close these 
schools the Dutch government has not only been reluctant to interfere in the 
running of such schools but has continued to provide subsidies (Balkenende, 
2006 cited in Veldhuis and van der Maas, 2007). Closing Islamic schools, on 
whatever grounds, would necessitate a constitutional amendment, and the 
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government is clearly not prepared to undertake a step of this magnitude.
4. 4 Influence of ethnic advisory bodies
In the 1970’s and 1980’s the Outch government provided regular funding 
to ethnic organizations. This funding still exists though it has become more 
limited and less focused. While in the past it was provided to individual eth-
nic groups, since 2011 support has been available generally for more inclusive 
activities. In the 1980’s and 1990’s ethnic groups were given funding to estab-
lish advisory bodies. These entities had considerable weight and the 
governments at the local and national levels were obliged to take their input 
into consideration in the area of policy formulation. This consultative process 
continues to exist although arguably the power of ethnic advisory councils 
has declined.
4. 5 Ethnic media presence
A number of hours on the Dutch national broadcasting company are set 
aside specifically for programming by Muslim, Jewish and Hindu organiza-
tions in various languages. While there is no government requirement for 
media organizations to allocate a certain segment of broadcast time to cover-
ing issues related to multiculturalism, there are numerous TV and radio 
programs catering to minority groups (Multiculturalism policy index, 2009)
4. 6 Ethnic dress code
While a ban on full-body covering burqas was proposed by the govern-
ment (Donner, 2011), it never became law. Such legislation would have made 
the Netherlands the third country in Europe, after France and Belgium, to 
outlaw niqab, but the change of government nixed the proposal.
5. 0 Conclusion
According to the census of 2012, approximately 20% of the Dutch popula-
tion were of immigrant origin, including 9.3% of immigrants coming from 
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neighboring EU states and 11.6% arriving from non-Western countries. This 
represents a significant increase compared to a decade earlier, particularly 
among the migrants with non-Western backgrounds (Annual Report on Inte-
gration 2012). It is natural that a demographic shift of such proportion would 
provoke a heated debate about the survival of the dominant culture, about 
the clash of values and about the need to consider measures to stop, or at 
least reduce, the influx of immigrants. The debate rhetoric captures the high-
lights in the media, and often it is the tone and the intensity of the discourse, 
rather that the concrete government policies that become the focus of aca-
demic analysis. In this paper I have argued this is what is actually happening 
in the case of the Netherlands.
Over the past 50 years, the relationship between the Dutch state and its 
non-native residents / citizens has gone through a series of fairly distinct 
phases. Prior to the 1980s this interaction was best characterized by an 
absence of a pragmatic approach to the needs and challenges of mainly labor 
migrants. Once the authorities came to an overdue realization that most of 
the immigrants were determined to make Holland their permanent home, the 
resultant policy put priority on the maintenance of the migrants’ cultural and 
linguistic identity. The publication of the report in 1989 which highlighted 
enormous inequalities in employment and education between migrants (par-
ticularly those of non-European origin) and the native-Dutch, alarmed the 
nation and paved the way for a policy focusing on the improvement in the 
socio-economic status of migrants. Various integration measures to facilitate 
their entry into the Dutch labor market, including languages courses, were 
implemented. During the last decade these measures have become more rigid 
and prescriptive, with the public demanding that migrants fulfil their ‘duties’ 
as functioning members of society first and foremost, before taking advan-
tage of the rights accorded to them.
The Dutch integration debate has taken on a progressively anti-Islamic 
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posture, with politicians like Geert Wilders speaking openly about the ‘Islami-
fication’ of Holland. The fact that his words seem to resonate with the voters 
(his Party for Freedom has the third largest number of seats in the Dutch 
parliament) prompted many analysts to declare multiculturalism dead in the 
Netherlands. However, such categorical conclusions are not supported by evi-
dence.
Many policies promulgated in the 1990s are still practiced today. Cer-
tainly, in some areas, notably the provision of mother tongue instruction, the 
state has taken a step back. The preservation of one’s linguistic identity and 
more broadly, of one’s cultural heritage has become a private affair, though 
even in this domain the state continues to provide subsidies in support of cul-
tural activities, advisory bodies, and ethnic broadcasting in the media
While the dialogue remains very polarized, several recent surveys point 
to a very tolerant attitude among the Dutch towards immigrants. The results 
of a Eurobarometer Survey conducted by the European Commission Direc-
torate-General in 2011, showed that among the 27 EU member states, Dutch 
respondents are consistently among the most positive about the effects of 
immigration on their country: 67% believe that immigration enriches the 
country, while 85% support equal rights for immigrants and national citizens 
(Awareness of Home Affairs, 2011). A survey conducted among Dutch college 
students in 2011 found that young people, by and large, welcome the pres-
ence of multiple cultures around them. Roughly 85% believe that diverse 
cultures benefit the country as a whole. On the issue of a rapid increase in 
the number of Muslim immigrants, approximately 80% replied that Dutch 
cultural norms are not threatened by this phenomenon (Ray, 2012). Based on 
the above, I believe it is premature to say that multiculturalism in the Neth-
erlands is dead.
What is perhaps very symbolic of the ambivalent state of the immigra-
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tion debate in the Netherlands today, where words speak louder than actions, 
the same survey (Ray, 2012) contains an interesting parallel: an overwhelming 
majority of young Dutch seem to support diversity in their midst, yet an 
even larger majority (92%) believe that immigrants in the Netherlands (espe-
cially Muslim immigrants) should integrate as soon as possible. National 
policies continue to reflect this contradictory public attitude through largely 
tolerant measures but attention-grabbing tough talk.
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